Greater Primacy for State-Building
in Congo?

JOHN S. MOOLAKKATTU

  One of the functions of politics is to mediate between competing groups in
society vying for access to resources of various kinds. This is a function
that cannot be easily left to nongovernmental actors. Many African conflicts
emerge from the failure or incapacity of the state to play the role of an
impartial mediator in a reasonably just manner. This is often attributed to
the patrimonial and privatized character of African states and their inability
to provide essential law and order functions, not to speak of developmental
ones. Restoration of the ability of the state to mediate conflicts among various
groups on the basis of certain rules that are accepted by a wide section
of society is crucial for a minimal level of order. While the state’s acts of
commission and omission have been responsible for many conflicts in Africa,
the weakening of the state, in turn, can worsen the situation. What is needed,
therefore, is the transformation of the state to a functioning institution capable
of performing a number of core functions such as provision of personal
security to citizens. This is obviously a long haul for many fragile African
states like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Institutionalist approaches to state-building are often looked on with a certain
degree of suspicion. There are victims whose experiences of the state
are negative and expectations from it very low, and see any increase in state
capacity with a certain degree of trepidation. Supporters of the neo-liberal
model are generally averse to the strengthening of the state apparatus and
want it to remain as perhaps the most important actor among a range of actors
involved in the process of governance. If one of the causes for the persistence
of conflicts in Africa is state failure not only to mediate conflicts, but also to
provide certain minimal services such as physical security to the public, then
the neo-liberal route to conflict recovery currently being promoted may not
be the right approach to achieve sustainable peace.
Attaching primacy to political normalization and state-building (not
nation-building) is therefore crucial to peace in Africa. State-building is defined
here as the process of equipping the state with the capacity, institutions,
GREATER PRIMACY FOR STATE-BUILDING IN CONGO? and legitimacy to act as a reasonably just and impartial mechanism, one that
not only mediates between different groups, but also creates an environment
in which interactions with citizens are made possible, and security and essential
services are provided. Lund and Wolpe say: “Whether . . . problems are
ultimately resolved depends on the dispositions and relationships of the political
leaders themselves who have the prime responsibility for facing them.”
An approach “that seeks to evoke these leaders’ own sense of responsibility
and desires for their country, and demonstrates how their interests can be
achieved through more collaborative ways of dealing with each other” needs
to be impressed upon them.
African countries are in the process of building an institutional structure
that tries to fuse values of their own society with those that are being
handed down to them by theWest in the guise of the international community.
They do not have the autonomy to choose a path of their own, unlike some
Asian countries that disengaged from their colonial linkages at a faster pace.
The authoritarian development route that Asian countries had adopted three
decades back is neither a desirable option nor is thinkable for African states
now. There is, however, a desire among many African states to disengage
from their neocolonial connections and develop political institutions relying
on endogenous resources. The creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), under the aegis of the African Union (AU) and the reluctance
of Africans to work with seemingly hegemonic mechanisms like the African
Command (AFRICOM) set up by the United States, in some ways, reflect that
desire.
The 2000 Brahimi report on United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping and
post-conflict reconstruction efforts says that consensus on the type and shape
of the state to be built, and agreement between all parties on the process
that will be used to create a future state, is necessary. These should not be
confined to the formal authority structures alone in the African situation, but
should also look at informal authority structures such as the Church and some
progressive traditional systems. The word “peacebuilding” in post-conflict
societies is seen primarily as an activity to be undertaken outside the state
structures. This needs to be corrected, and the state should be brought in
as the most important actor in post-conflict reconstruction. The World Bank
has realized its importance quite recently and has merged its peacebuilding
fund into a common State and Peacebuilding Fund. Given its predilections
for a neo-liberal state, however, its efforts aimed at strengthening the state are
severely circumscribed.
Often, aid for reconstruction efforts reaches the agencies bypassing the
state structures. The national budget must have primacy in heralding
policy reform. External aid is often not routed through the national budgetary
mechanisms. Instead, parallel structures are created for its delivery. In other
words, donors must work to strengthen and not undermine national systems
of governance. Routing aid through the fledgling state institutions will make
them functional and contribute to the enhancement of their legitimacy. The
international agencies often project their activities, and, in doing so, indirectly
undermine the state structures in the eyes of the public. Brahimi said: “Even
the United Nations and its agencies are all too often guilty of giving too much
importance to considerations of prestige and their own funding needs at the
expense of what is actually required to establish and consolidate peace and
stability.”
The lack of emphasis on state-building will leave the state structures no
different from their earlier forms after the international intervention, and may
only serve to perpetuate conflict and undermine the state’s future capacity
for building peace. The state could be seen as a means to achieve peace
and order and an arbiter between competing interests. All the efforts of the
international agencies should be aimed at developing an early exit strategy
rather than engaging in actions that lead to a situation of self-perpetuation.
Liberal democracy and a free market are two elements that are sought to be
promoted in states recovering from violent conflicts, ostensibly to assist these
countries in making the transition to peace from a state of anarchy. While
it is true that Western democracies have achieved a “security community”
status, the thesis does not hold well in countries like the DRC. It must be
noted that very few African countries have fought each other despite their
poor democratic record. Conflict in Africa is predominantly intrastate and is
surprisingly not centered on questioning the territorial integrity of states like
the DRC, which is known for its sheer size and ungoverned spaces.
The international project of post-conflict reconstruction is based on a
standardized agenda that adopts strategies of democratization either through
the existing institutions or without them if they are found to be in poor shape.
The DRC is one state where the latter has largely been the case. The state in
the DRC was seen as a pariah by the donors, and they often tried to circumvent
it in their activities. This has led to neither peace nor state-building. Instead,
there exists an all-around lack of security, especially for women and children.
It is a question of sequencing activities. Even if the regime that is propped up
tends to have some predatory elements, it is always better that local people
themselves are enlisted to evolve corrective measures that fit their notions of
justice, even if those states may not live up to the standards envisaged in the
West.
Part of the reason why international agencies take a cavalier attitude
toward the existing state lies in the increasing salience of the doctrine of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has undercut the inviolability of the
sovereignty principle (this has been stated in unambiguous terms by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS] since
2001). The General Assembly has also concurred with the view that state.
failure to perform its assigned tasks to the citizenry will invite the application
of the R2P doctrine. There are some who want all post-conflict reconstruction
efforts to be driven by national forces, while others insist that international
agencies tidy up the mess. There are yet others who take an instrumental view
of it: Whichever party is in command is immaterial if the end results are good.
These are issues that need to be addressed contextually. One rule of the thumb
should be to streamline all international action to work in tandem with local
and national authority structures, including those of an informal nature, so
that local actors feel empowered in the process and feel a sense of ownership
The parallel aid structures created by international agencies often attract
the best human resources available in the country, compared to the poorly
paid government personnel. State officials see themselves marginalized by the
mere presence and capacity of the external actors and the way they dominate
the post-conflict reconstruction processes. Staff that are recruited by the international
actors are much better paid and enjoy much better physical facilities
compared to state officials. Instead, focus should be on supporting state officials
with better incentives so that they gradually disengage from rent-seeking
behavior. Consider, for example, the project-based approach to reconstruction
that is adopted by international agencies. The Congolese seem not to be involved
in the identification and implementation of projects. More meritorious
local civil servants found working in these international projects much more
lucrative, leading to the flight of personnel from the government sector to the
nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector. Those who could not do that
resorted to the familiar predatory strategies, partly for survival reasons. In the
Eastern parts of the DRC, although government posts are manned, salaries
are seldom paid so much so that officials prey on every opportunity to earn a
living. The predatory nature of the state is only reinforced by the international
presence in such cases.
Some Congolese authorities and international experts argue that themost
important priority is resolving the problems of security by putting reform
of the police, judiciary, and army at the top of the list. Others argue that
without tackling the problems of governance and high-level institutionalized
corruption, all reform efforts will be meaningless. Where life itself is in
danger, creating institutions in which life can be protected should receive
higher priority.What exists in the DRC is a kind of Hobbesian state of nature,
and it is my contention that the Hobbesian logic of creating a state that
can restore order should take pride of place in post-conflict reconstruction
efforts in the country. In other words, political authority needs to be organized
securely before we can think of any form of community life.
In the DRC, local and international NGOs often sideline the state in
their development initiatives. While it is true that the existing structures are
corrupt and hold out little promise, it is perhaps only through the very same
structures that a sustainable order can be built. The core functions of the
state cannot be performed by any of the NGOs, however well-endowed they
may be. Although the Congolese state is unable to govern, it has registered
its presence everywhere through its officials. People even now access certain
elements of the government providing services such as education, electricity,
licensing, and so on. It should be noted that the African state has not aspired to
be aWestphalian state. Notions like sovereignty did not matter tomostAfrican
leaders until recently. This is partly due to the grey area of authority between
indigenous and modern state institutions. Throughout the DRC’s long years
of state decay, ordinary Congolese tried to fend for themselves through village
associations, churches, professional bodies, and civil society groups.
In North Kivu, non-state institutions like churches and customary bodies
have filled the power vacuum created by state. Councils of elders have been
established with representatives from different ethno-linguistic groups, and
these councils engage in conflict resolution and tackling governance issues.
These are certainly nascent institutions that have not come up in opposition
to the state, but have stepped in to occupy the vacuum created by the state.
They still rely on the state for obtaining licenses, academic certification,
accreditation, and so on.
Early creation of a minimally functioning state is essential to maintain
peace, however narrowly it may be defined. Other institutions should see
themselves as transitional arrangements to be replaced by the state in the long
term. While it is true that delivery of a number of relief functions through the
international agencies and local NGOs will yield quick results, this should
be seen at best as a short-term arrangement. Every effort should be made to
work with whatever state institutions are present as early as possible. This
demands a high degree of humility on the part of individuals acting on behalf
of international agencies and recognition of the context and complexity of the
work they do.
What sort of state-building should take place? It is here that the role
of outside actors becomes suspect. First of all, many African states are not
sought to be recreated, but perhaps to be created in the first place. This applies
more aptly to the DRC where the past is no guide for action. The creation
of states in the image of the West is not easily attainable and should not be
attempted. Perhaps what can be done is to allow the local forces to take the
lead in any sort of political arrangement that might evolve, with the outsiders
playing a merely facilitative role. The key here is to allow indigenization so
that the structures that emerge from the process are organic and people are
able to have some affinity with them.
The absence of a proper cadre of civil service in the DRC and the
presence of a proper cadre of civil service in the DRC and the
presence of international actors create a situation in which the Congolese
government is able to transfer questions of accountability to its international
partners.
Theodore Trefon wrote:
The reform planning process in DRC is flawed. There is a missing link in it. The
missing link is a qualified, dynamic, honest, hard-working cadre of civil servants
who are decently paid, respected by service users and motivated to rebuild the
country. This explains in large part why reform initiatives have not achieved the
expected results. The absence or sluggishness of reform is also accounted for by
the fact that the massive presence of international reform efforts has taken the
burden off the Congolese government and Congolese civil servants. Instead of being
accountable to the people, authorities reassign the abstract notion of accountability
to its international partners. Authorities are exonerated from the responsibilities
associated with their fundamental mandate of facilitating the development agenda
and improving the well-being of the population.
Many scholars tend to be pessimistic about the prospects of building an
effective Congolese state, and some even cite the high costs involved in
such an enterprise. But the fact of the matter is that there has never been a
Congolese state worth the name so far, and this is an investment that any
worthwhile post-conflict reconstruction has to focus on for long-term peace
and stability. Despite all pessimistic accounts, Congo has not broken apart
and remains as a unitary state with some remnants of the state structure
everywhere, even though functioning in a personalized way. Instead of fostering
fissiparous tendencies in a time of crisis, political leaders have been
more concerned as to how they could have a share of the national cake of
power. This shows that the base of the Congolese state is relatively unshaken,
even though its translation into concrete government entities is fraught with
problems.
While donors have increasingly come to appreciate that both peace- and
state-building processes are inherently political, technical approaches
continue to dominate. Donors have to develop their political sensitivity even
more in complex scenarios such as that of the DRC. Countries like South
Africa work primarily through the DRC state structures in their conflict recovery
support programs. It will undoubtedly take considerable time and
efforts to build a minimally functioning Congolese state. All the short-term
activities of the international agencies should be tailored toward this long-term
objective. What is needed immediately is a realistic assessment of the existing
capacities at the national and regional levels, and how international agencies
can work with them, strengthening them in the process. This means recognizing
the primacy of the state, even if it is found to be fragile and predatory.
This would set in motion a cumulative process of enhancing the capacity of
the state. It is necessary to ensure that the Congolese are in the drivers’ seat
in any sort of intervention, and only then will there be local ownership of the
process and validation of the principle of sovereignty.
Finally, women and their concerns demand that state-building, particularly
its law and order functions, are focused. They are the victims of the
failure of the state to provide security or, in some cases, the state itself is seen
as one of the sources of their insecurity. It is in their interest that the core
function of providing security to people in the minimalist sense is taken up
seriously. This is because women can never engage in any productive activity,
including agriculture, to support the ones whose care has been entrusted to
them for fear of being raped with impunity. Raped women experience not
only the physical and mental trauma accompanying the act, but also continue
to face the social stigma throughout their lives. From the point of view of the
ordinary people, far from democracy, it is a certain amount of predictability in
their lives that matters. They have never looked on the Congolese state as an
institution capable of providingwelfare services.Corruption and issues related
to democratization are concerns of the more educated and mobile segments
within Congolese society that they share with the international agencies, and
such concerns, while legitimate, should be addressed at a later stage of the
process of state-building.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Brahimi, L. 2007. “Statebuilding in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries.” 7th Global Forum on
Reinventing Government, Building Trust in Government. Vienna: June 26–29.
Doe, Samuel G. 2009. “Indigenizing Postconflict State Reconstruction in Africa: A Conceptual
Framework.” Africa Peace and Conflict Journal 2(1): 1–16.
Lund, Michael and Howard Wolpe. 2009. “Engaging Leaders for Statebuilding: The
Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic id=1411&fuseaction=topics.
publications&group id=637008>.
Menocal, Alina Rocha. 2009. “‘State-Building for Peace’: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions,”
ODI Briefing Paper 52. <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3673.pdf>.
Trefon, Theodore. 2010. “Administrative Obstacles to Reform in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 76(4): 702–722.
Vlassenroot, Koen and Hans Romkema. 2007. “Local Governance and Leadership
in Eastern DRC.” <http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publications/working%20paper/localgov
rapport eng def.pdf>.
John S. Moolakkattu is a Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute
of Technology Madras, Chennai, India. E-mail: moolakkattu@gmail.com